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Abstract: Scientific knowledge is not merely a matter of reconciling theories and laws 
with data and observations.  Science presupposes a number of metatheoretic shaping 
principles in order to judge good methods and theories from bad.  Some of these principles 
are metaphysical (e.g., the uniformity of nature) and some are methodological (e.g., the need 
for repeatable experiments).  While many shaping principles have endured since the scientific 
revolution, others have changed in response to conceptual pressures both from within science 
and without.  Many of them have theistic roots.  For example, the notion that nature conforms 
to mathematical laws flows directly from the early modern presupposition that there is a 
divine Lawgiver.  This interplay between theism and shaping principles is often 
unappreciated in discussions about the relation between science and religion.  Today, of 
course, naturalists reject the influence of theism and prefer to do science on their terms.  But 
as Robert Koons and Alvin Plantinga have argued, this is more difficult than is typically 
assumed.  In particular, they argue, metaphysical naturalism is in conflict with several 
metatheoretic shaping principles, especially explanatory virtues such as simplicity and with 
scientific realism more broadly.  I will discuss these arguments as well as possible responses.  
In the end, theism is able to provide justification for the philosophical foundations of science 
that naturalism cannot.  
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Science and religion, we often told, have had a poor and sometimes hostile relation 
for several centuries.  Between rigorous empirical methods and the discovery of the laws of 
nature, theism is left with no real intellectual work to do.  This and more is the received 
wisdom of naturalism.1  But is it true?   
To answer that question, let us begin with a simple pyramid model for the overall 
structure of science.  The base constitutes “the data”:  observations, experiments, and 
simulations.  The second layer organizes and explains what is in the first by way of laws, 
theories, and models.  For present purposes, the top level is the most important and also the 
least recognized, what I call metatheoretic shaping principles.2  This is where the philosophy 
of science and science proper blend into one another.  Among other things, such principles 
help determine what good theories look like, as well as how one should proceed in their 
development.  Some shaping principles are metaphysical.  Foremost among these is the 
primacy of laws:  The universe is governed by a set of regularities, the laws of nature.  
Philosophers actively debate different ways of understanding laws, sometimes reducing them 
to something more basic, sometimes deflating them to be less metaphysical.  Whatever one’s 
views, the utility of laws in science must be accounted for one way or another.   
A related shaping principle is the uniformity of nature.  This is uniformity across 
space and time.  This principle says that the laws of nature are the same now as they always 
have been, and the laws are the same here as they are everywhere else in the universe.  In 
other words, nature does not make dramatic changes, at least at the level of laws.  This 
provides the stability required for induction and successful predictions.     
Shaping principles regarding causation have changed over time.  The early modern 
period starts with the rejection of Aristotelian causes other than efficient causation.  Under the 
new mechanical philosophy, nature was thought to work only by way of contact forces.  (This 
is the principle that Newtonian gravitation seemed to violate, much to the dismay of 
Newton’s contemporaries.)  There was also Leibniz’s Law of Continuity, which says that 
“nature makes no leaps.”  Change from one system state to the next is always continuous.  
While that principle was important for the development of differential equations, it was 
overthrown by quantum mechanics. 
Epistemic shaping principles include the demand for repeatable observations and 
procedures for conducting experiments.  This is also where the so-called “explanatory 
virtues” are found.  Good explanations embody simplicity, testability, fit with background 
knowledge, empirical adequacy, and in some sciences mathematical elegance.  Richard 
Swinburne has argued that among these simplicity is the most important, especially for 
resolving cases of underdetermination of theory by data (Swinburne 1979, 55).  For my part, I 
do not see that any particular virtue trumps any of the others.   
That there are such principles that govern the development of science is not news to 
philosophers.  What we often pass by, however, is that many have theistic origins.  The laws 
                                                 
1 Throughout this paper, ‘naturalism’ refers to the metaphysical thesis that there are 
no supernatural entities.  I am not referring to the weaker idea of methodological naturalism 
that says science should proceed without reference to supernatural entities, regardless of 
whether they exist. 
2 That term and this model has its roots in the work of Del Ratzsch.  See (Ratzsch 
2001, chap. 7) and (Koperski 2015, chap. 1). 
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of nature themselves are the clearest examples.  For the early moderns, the existence of laws 
was straightforward:  kings proclaimed the laws for a country; God decreed the laws for 
nature.  This was a radical change from Greek thought.  Of course, Aristotle believed in the 
orderliness of reality, but he attributed it to the internal essences of things.  Rocks fall straight 
down because that is what their essence dictates.  Fire goes up because that is what it does by 
nature.  But laws are not part of that picture.  Laws in Greek thought were matters of politics.  
Nature is one realm; government is completely different.  The idea of a “natural law” was 
something of an oxymoron.   
Matters had changed dramatically by the 17th century.  Between theism and 
mechanistic philosophy, the idea that God designed the universe by way of mathematical 
laws became the norm.  Those were the principles in Newton’s Principia.  The uniformity of 
those laws, Newton argued, is due to God’s omnipresence (Opticks 1730 Query 31).  That 
they do not change over time, said Descartes, is because of God’s immutability (Principles of 
Philosophy 1644 II 36). 
Simplicity and parsimony were also defended on theological grounds throughout the 
modern era (Sober 2015, 22–51).  This is somewhat ironic, given how Ockham’s Razor is 
used against theism these days.  Earlier thinkers tended to start with God and then infer 
parsimony as something we should expect from a rational creator.  By the 19th century, the 
inference was flipped.  Now the simplicity of the laws was used as an argument for God’s 
existence.  As for mathematical elegance, Kepler believed that “God has established nothing 
without geometrical beauty” (1952, 1025).  
More surprising is how theism motivated empirical observations and experimentation.  
It begins with the idea that God had many options available in creation, including which laws 
to ordain and which specific mechanisms to employ.  Since these choices were rooted in 
God’s will rather than his intellect, the only way to discover them was through observation.  
Natural philosophers could not merely reason out the implications of this or that substantial 
form, as mathematician Roger Cotes put it in the preface of the 2nd edition of Newton’s 
Principia: 
 
[This] world, so diversified with that variety of forms and motions . . ., could 
arise from nothing but the perfectly free will of God directing and presiding 
over all. 
 
From this fountain it is that those laws, which we call the laws of Nature, have 
flowed, in which there appear many traces indeed of the most wise 
contrivance, but not the least shadow of necessity. These therefore we must 
not seek from uncertain conjectures, but learn them from observations and 
experiments. ([1687] 1962, xxxii)  
 
In other words, empiricism itself originally had a theological basis.3  
For this to work, God had to design our reason and senses so that we could make 
discoveries, something like what the medievals called the “adequation of the intellect to 
                                                 
3 This generalization fits Newton and his followers better than Leibniz or Descartes.  
For Leibniz, God’s choices were constrained by the Principle of Sufficient Reason.  And 
while Descartes was an arch voluntarist, he thought we could make valid inferences about the 
laws of motion based on God’s immutability.  See (Harrison 2013).   
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reality” (Plantinga 2011, 269).  Kepler put it this way:  “Those laws are within the grasp of 
the human mind. God wanted us to recognize them by creating us after his own image so that 
we could share in his own thoughts…” (Plantinga 2011, 277).  Between the rational design of 
the universe and our God-given ability to discern it, early modern thinkers got very close to 
what is now called scientific realism. 
There are other examples, but these are sufficient to make the point:  several of the 
foundational metaphysical and epistemological principles that scientists still accept as “the 
way things are” and the best means of proceeding had their roots in theism. 
So then, what happens if that foundation is removed?  What is the naturalistic 
philosopher to do with the laws of nature, for example?  Nancy Cartwright gives one clear 
answer: 
 
I think in the concept of law there is a little too much of God.  We try to 
finesse the issue . . . [but] in the end the concept of a law does not make sense 
without the supposition of a law-giver.  (Cartwright 1993, 299) 
 
Some, like Cartwright, try to find a surrogate for laws.  They might appeal to causal powers 
or dispositions as metaphysically fundamental.  Laws would supervene on such things.  Many 
philosophers of science hope to deflate laws into mere law-statements, the Mill-Ramsey-
Lewis view being the most prominent example.  M-R-L laws function as something like 
axioms in our overall best system of scientific knowledge, but have no metaphysical 
significance.  They are not part of reality itself, which eliminates the need to explain their 
origin.  
Robert Koons argues that while many shaping principles are explained by theism, the 
naturalist must merely accept them as brute facts (2003, 81–84).  That the cosmos has an 
intelligible, stable structure must be taken as a given.  Simplicity, elegance, and other 
explanatory virtues can be reliable indicators of truth if they track the choices made by an 
intelligent agent.  But what if there is no such agent? 
Consider an analogy.  The reverse engineering of cars works because engineers from 
rival companies can rightly assume that new cars are designed with particular desiderata in 
mind.  They know that the designers wanted a combination of speed, power, and reliability.  
Engineers from competing companies proceed by looking for how these ends are cashed out 
in a new vehicle.  That is just what reverse engineering is.  
But what if, going back to the science question now, there is no designer?  The 
explanatory virtues work, but there would be no particular reason why they should work.  If 
their usefulness is all just a happy coincidence, how could they be reliable?  As Koons says, 
“[The] materialist has no adequate explanation of how the fundamental laws of nature are so 
constituted as to be learnable through experience” (2003, 85). 
Matters are worse according to Alvin Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against 
naturalism (2011, chap. 10).  Say that our cognitive faculties are reliable only if they mostly 
produce true beliefs.  Colorblind people do not have reliable perceptions about color; 
Alzheimer patients do not have reliable memory.  But normal, healthy people have generally 
reliable faculties, leading to true beliefs most of the time. 
Neo-Darwinian evolution, in contrast, is very good as producing one thing:  beings 
that survive in a given environment.  Survival can be improved along four axes:  getting food, 
keeping oneself from becoming food, fighting when necessary, and reproducing.  Natural 
selection selects traits that further one of those four.  Plantinga’s key point is that truth is not 
on that list. 
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For any advanced species that survives over a long period of time, its cognitive 
faculties will be adapted to its environment.  The species’ neurological traits will determine 
both (i) the content of its beliefs—if it has any,4 and (ii) its behavior.  But why think, asks 
Plantinga, that the content of a creature’s beliefs will be true?  We desire truth, but all that 
matters for fitness is whether the creature behaves the right way in a given set of 
circumstances.  If a creature has beliefs at all, their content is irrelevant so long as they 
induce behavior that helps the creature survive.  Clearly a deer has to behave in the right way 
when facing a predator:  it needs to run.  But that does not entail that the deer has to have true 
beliefs about the predator.  Its cognitive faculties merely have to produce adaptive behavior.   
The same is true for all of our pre-human ancestors.  Natural selection favored 
primates that behaved in ways that promoted survival.  The upshot is that, under naturalistic 
evolution, there is nothing special about our cognitive faculties.  As far as natural selection is 
concerned, there is no particular reason why the contents of our beliefs should be true.  Our 
cognitive faculties are adaptive, and so useful in promoting survival, but a high degree of 
fitness only entails something about behavior.  It need have nothing to do with true beliefs.  
But if our cognitive faculties are not typically producing true beliefs, then the truth of 
scientific beliefs is also in doubt.  Hence the naturalistic Darwinist has a defeater for his/her 
own beliefs.   
Surprisingly, there are naturalists that sympathize with this this line of thinking.  
Darwin himself worried about it and Thomas Nagel caused something of an uproar when 
agreeing that  
 
unlike divine benevolence, the application of evolutionary theory to the 
understanding of our own cognitive capacities should undermine, though it 
need not completely destroy, our confidence in them. . . .  Evolutionary 
naturalism implies that we shouldn’t take any of our convictions seriously, 
including the scientific world picture on which evolutionary naturalism itself 
depends. (Nagel 2012, 27–28) 
 
There are many replies to Plantinga’s argument and I will not attempt to analyze them 
here.  Instead, consider a narrower conclusion.  Say that one believes two things:  we live in 
an orderly, stable cosmos and our cognitive faculties are generally reliable.  These are 
necessary conditions for scientific realism.  As we have seen, the theist has reasons for 
believing them.  Plantinga’s argument, at the very least, raises some doubts for the naturalist.  
True scientific beliefs might be possible in a world where the Blind Watchmaker of natural 
selection rules, but they do not seem likely. 
One might wonder if this is just a philosopher’s problem.  Perhaps science itself can 
help to resolve the matter.  In fact, cognitive scientists at the University of California, Irvine 
and Rutgers University recently published a paper that is getting some attention across 
disciplines.  They begin by showing that textbook evolutionary theory contradicts Plantinga.  
Our perceptions are “a detailed and accurate view of reality, exactly as we would expect if 
truth about the outside world helps us to navigate it more effectively” (Hoffman, Singh, and 
Prakash 2015, 1481).  Perceptual mechanisms that were not veridical would be weeded out 
                                                 
4 This claim presupposes that naturalistic evolution would only produce material 
beings.  There would therefore be no immaterial souls or minds that might be involved in the 
belief forming process.  
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by natural selection.  (Note that when they use words like ‘truth’ and ‘veridical’, they are not 
talking about the content of beliefs.  Their view is about accurate mental representations.  The 
way these researchers use it, birds have veridical perceptions even though they have no 
beliefs in the propositional sense.) 
Of course, not all animal perceptions are veridical.  Frogs do not detect flies.  They 
detect moving black spots of a particular size (Hoffman, Singh, and Prakash 2015, 1481).  
Some frogs can be surrounded by edible, recently deceased flies and not detect them.  
Moreover, male jewel beetles do not see females.  They detect a particular glossy shade of 
brown that corresponds to the female’s wing casings.  This explains why male beetles will 
swarm empty beer-bottles, ignoring the females in the process and causing at least one 
population to collapse.  In these and many other cases the perceptions were not based on 
veridical information, “but rather on heuristics that worked in the niche where they evolved” 
(Hoffman, Singh, and Prakash 2015, 1481).  Perceptions like these, based on fallible 
heuristics, are “good enough” in the sense that they usually promote survival. 
Their research question is this:  When does natural selection favor the veridical over 
the merely heuristic?  Should we expect frogs to one day see flies and not merely moving 
spots?  If so, under what circumstances and how prevalent will such an adaptation be?  Using 
evolutionary game theory and genetic algorithms, one can calculate how different “perceptual 
strategies” compete with one another.  These will show which traits can coexist, which will 
dominate a population, and which will go extinct. 
The studies simulated a wide range of visual perceptions.  At one end is what they 
called “omniscient realism,” which would include perfectly accurate perceptions from across 
the electromagnetic spectrum.  That is an idealization, but one thought to be important for the 
study.  Several, less-accurate perceptions were also simulated.  The one most like human 
perception is “hybrid realism.”  This allowed for the veridical detection of shape and 
motion—what are often thought of as primary qualities—but also color, which they take to be 
merely phenomenological.  At the far extreme they included the “interface perceptual 
strategy” in which no perceptions are veridical.  For such a creature, none of the properties 
that it perceives to be in its environment exist in reality.  If there are any primary qualities in 
the mind-independent world, that creature does not perceive them.   
One might think that this final option is doomed to the heavy hand of natural 
selection.  The reason they chose to include it is this.  Consider the “save” button in a word 
processor.  The icon probably looks like a 3½ inch floppy disk.  While colleges student know 
what floppy drives are, none of their computers have them.  In a few years, they might not 
have any memory of such things.  As Hoffman points out, however, that need not be a 
problem.  Clicking on the icon will still work just fine even though there is no such thing as a 
floppy drive in the computer.  The interface perceptual strategy takes all of a creature’s 
perceptions to function similarly.  None of the properties that it perceives are literally out 
there in the world, although what it does perceive is correlated in such a way that it allows 
that creature to interact with its environment.  That is sufficient, they argue, to include it in 
evolutionary simulations.  
Their studies thus included a range of realist options of perception and one anti-realist 
one—the interface view.  These were cast as competing traits in game-theoretic evolutionary 
simulations, as if they were different species each with a different range of perception.  So 
then, when do the realist options out-compete the anti-realist one?  Never.  As Hoffman put it, 
“According to evolution by natural selection, an organism that sees reality as it is will never 
be more fit than an organism of equal complexity that sees none of reality but is just tuned to 
fitness.  Never” (Gefter 2016).  More precisely, various studies apart from their own show 
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that when interface perceptual strategies compete with any realist strategy, the former will 
drive the latter into extinction (Hoffman, Singh, and Prakash 2015, 1487).  Not co-existence, 
which is an option.  Extinction.  The lone exception is a specially constructed environment 
where evolutionary advantage is forced to change in lockstep with truth.  In other words, the 
deck can be stacked so that anti-realist perceptions do not win, but that is not the generic 
case.  They conclude, “The key insight from these evolutionary games is this:  Natural 
selection tunes perception to payoffs, not to truth” (Hoffman, Singh, and Prakash 2015, 
1487). 
One might think of their work as “Kantian evolution.”  If Kantian categories, which 
operate on sense-data to produce our phenomenal experience, were subject to evolutionary 
pressures, then natural selection is far more likely to give us categories that produce an 
adequate, representational phenomenal realm, rather than one that accurately depicts 
noumenal reality.  They even explicitly mention the idea that “our perception of physical 
objects in space-time no more reflects reality than does our perception of a flat and stationary 
earth” (Hoffman, Singh, and Prakash 2015, 1491).   
Let’s put this in context.  The question is the status of metatheoretic shaping 
principles, especially those related to scientific realism.  For our purposes, we can ignore the 
larger issue of whether naturalistic evolution is ultimately self-defeating.  Even so, there does 
still seem to be a tension between natural selection and scientific realism.  According to 
Hoffman and his colleagues, when realist perceptual mechanisms have to compete with anti-
realist, heuristic ones, the latter win.  Perceptual anti-realism drives realism into extinction.  
Internal, mental representations need only be reliable: 
 
We’ve been shaped to have perceptions that keep us alive, so we have to take 
them seriously.  If I see something that I think of as a snake, I don’t pick it up.  
If I see a train, I don’t step in front of it.  I’ve evolved these symbols to keep 
me alive, so I have to take them seriously.  But it’s a logical flaw to think that 
if we have to take it seriously, we also have to take it literally. (Gefter 2016) 
 
In short, naturalistic evolution produces reliable perceptions—correlated with reality.  It does 
not produce realistic perceptions, showing us how things actually are. 
Reliable with respect to what?  The answer, in terms of natural selection, is our 
environment.  Clearly our perceptions—and our cognitive faculties more generally—do help 
us navigate everyday situations.  In terms of physics, that means medium-sized objects 
moving relatively slow.  Our ancient ancestors were very good at finding berries, hunting 
animals without lethal claws, and avoiding animals that had them.  But there is no particular 
reason, in terms of evolution, that we should be able to understand Planck-level physics or 
relativity.  Quantum effects are generally hidden behind a very classical-looking world.  And 
relativity only becomes apparent at cosmic scales or when objects are traveling over half the 
speed of light.  Such phenomena cannot manifest themselves so as to influence our 
evolutionary development and so could do no work in shaping our cognitive faculties.  A 
naturalist might rightly wonder, then, how reliable our cognitive faculties are when it comes 
to abstract physics.   
To sum up, most theists believe that God wants us to have access to truth, rather than 
merely survive.  Guided, theistic evolution provides a means to ensure that our senses, 
reason, and memory are up to the task.  From a naturalistic point of view, however, scientific 
realism about fundamental physics has no such grounding.  Without some sort of buttress or 
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hidden variable—some principle alongside natural selection that has a preference for truth—
evolution is not likely to produce realistic theoretical beliefs.   
If one is a naturalist and rejects the theistic basis for the rational structure of nature or 
the reliability of our faculties for understanding that structure, what options are available? 
One could appeal to chance.  After all, nothing here shows that nature cannot have a 
rational structure or that reliable faculties are nomologically impossible.  In terms of 
naturalistic evolution, such things are merely unlikely, but unlikely things happen.  This 
seems to be philosopher Jerry Fodor’s approach.  In his view, reliable conscious intelligence 
was a “hopeful monster,” a term made popular by paleontologist Stephen J. Gould (Fodor 
2002, 31).  A hopeful monster is an unlikely macro-evolutionary change that just happened to 
work in its environment.  It is not something that a good Darwinian would have expected, but 
it is still possible given enough time. 
These sorts of arguments are notoriously hard to evaluate.  In principle, any 
nomologically possible event can be explained away by appeal to chance.  If we live in the 
right kind of infinite multiverse, for example, then there must be some universe like this one 
that beat the evolutionary odds.  There will also be one in which my book sells a million 
copies, and one where a massive diamond meteorite falls in our yard.  Given sufficient 
probabilistic resources, even the most fanciful event might be nothing more than a matter of 
chance with no further explanation needed. 
One might instead simply reject scientific realism.  Perhaps science is not about 
discovering the deep truths of physical reality.  Both the history and philosophy of science 
provide reasons to think this might be the case.  After all, there are many examples of 
successful theories that were eventually overthrown.  Scientists, it seems to me, are naively 
overconfident about this question, dismissively rejecting anti-realism out of hand.  But as 
Kyle Stanford has argued (2006), textbook science depends on what options scientists could 
come up with at a given point in time.  What counts as a scientific truth depends very much 
on historical happenstance.  Niels Bohr preferred the Copenhagen approach to quantum 
mechanics that Einstein opposed.  Decades later, Bohmian mechanics was developed:  an 
empirically equivalent, deterministic quantum theory with no collapse of the wave-function.  
Many physicists see the Bohmian approach as an ad hoc way of fitting quantum phenomena 
into a more classical framework.  But what if Bohmian mechanics had been developed in 
1923?  Would we now be thinking of it as the standard view and that the Copenhagen 
approach was the odd alternative?  Would anyone now believe that nature contained an 
element of irreducible randomness?  This illustrates Stanford’s challenge:  if some of the 
things we believe about quantum physics are only because Bohm failed to get there first, why 
should we take standard quantum mechanics realistically?  In short, there are reasons for a 
scientific realist to tread lightly. 
Nonetheless, it would be difficult for most naturalists to embrace global anti-realism 
given that the success of science, understood in realist terms, is often touted as the best 
argument for naturalism in the first place.  Naturalism says that only natural entities exist.  
What are those?  The sorts things that the natural sciences study.  Questions about 
fundamental ontology are left to science itself.  But if science is not in the business of 
discovering what really exists, as the anti-realist says, then it would be in no position to 
answer those questions. 
The best option for the naturalist, it seems to me, lies elsewhere.  Say that Koons and 
Plantinga are right:  Naturalists tend to believe in both scientific realism and evolutionary 
biology, but the two seem to be in tension with one another.  Beliefs at the level of 
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evolutionary biology are in conflict with more abstract beliefs in epistemology and the 
philosophy of science.   
While this can be uncomfortable from a cognitive point of view, it is also quite 
common.  There are all sorts of conceptual tensions with no resolution in sight, some within 
physics itself.  The one between quantum mechanics and general relativity is the best known, 
but there are many more.  These tensions and mismatches are the main reason why full-blown 
reductionism has failed (Koperski 2015, chap. 6).  Forget about reducing psychology to 
neuroscience.  There may never be a completed reduction of thermodynamics to atomic 
physics or of classical chaos to quantum mechanics.  The reductionist dream of a fully unified 
science is a promissory note that will not be paid off.   
Matters only get worse when trying to square physics with metaphysics.  Do you 
believe that the past and future are intrinsically different?  If so, space-time physics will 
present some difficulties.  How about free will?  It may be that some sort of soft determinism 
is the best that science itself can accommodate.  That is not to say that one should 
immediately give up libertarian freedom or the passage of time if science seems to be in 
conflict with such views.  The point is merely that there are tensions between science and 
common philosophical beliefs that many of us hold.  There are, of course, strategies for 
reconciling these matters.  Or one might hope that there must be some way to reconcile 
fundamental science and more abstract beliefs, even if no solution is currently known. 
The naturalist can make a similar move.  Even if neo-Darwinism and scientific 
realism are in tension, there is still a great deal of conceptual distance between the two.  
Plantinga thinks we can clearly see how evolution impinges on philosophy.  Perhaps the 
naturalist, or at least the naturalist who has rejected reductionism, should be skeptical.  
Medical science has failed to sort out the causal links between eggs, consumed cholesterol, 
blood cholesterol, heart disease, and longevity.  Perhaps we just are not smart enough to 
understand how evolution could produce creatures with veridical cognitive abilities.  
Call this response skeptical naturalism, based on a similar strategy in philosophy of 
religion known as skeptical theism.  The latter is the view that while general truths about God 
are knowable, one cannot know in any individual case why God acts in any particular way.  
So the skeptical theist believes there are good answers to the problem of evil from a God’s-
eye point of view, but those reasons are not knowable in any specific case.  The skeptical 
naturalist is a scientific realist who believes in evolutionary biology, but does not believe that 
we can clearly understand all of the connections between them, weaving through 
epistemology, psychology, neurophysiology, and the rest.  The skeptical naturalist believes 
that somehow it all meshes together, but we are not in a position to grasp the causal relations.  
In my view, this is an expression of faith, in this case faith in naturalism.  This is not a defect, 
since I do not think that finite creatures can get around in the world without faith, regardless 
of what naturalists typically say about such things. 
Putting realism to the side, let’s circle back and briefly consider some other shaping 
principles.  
Koons says that the naturalist has to accept many principles that they have inherited 
from theism as brute.  Is that a problem?  Perhaps it does not matter how scientists stumbled 
on ideas like the uniformity of nature.  The point is that they work.  Shaping principles are 
not algorithms; they are rules-of-thumb.  If these principles stop being useful with respect to 
future science, they will be replaced with new ones.  That is what happened when quantum 
mechanics came along, despite Einstein’s objections. 
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However, the naturalist will have a harder time with explanatory virtues like 
simplicity and elegance.  Two things need to be explained: (i) why there are laws, 
symmetries, etc., that have such properties; and (ii) how we are able to reliably discern them.   
One approach is to treat the aesthetic virtues the way a Humean treats causation.  
Hume was fine with events, like pushing a book and the book falling on the floor.  What 
Hume famously denied was that there is something over and above those events:  causation 
itself.  For a good Humean, the sense that the pushing caused the book to fall is nothing more 
than a psychological projection.  Causation is not out there in the world to be discovered. 
The Humean might take a similar approach to the aesthetic shaping principles.  On 
this view, beauty is in the eye of the beholder.  Scientists are not detecting anything in 
mathematical physics that corresponds to elegance.  They have instead mistaken their 
projections for discoveries. 
Like all projectivist accounts, realists are not likely to accept this story.  The dialectic 
is by now quite common.  The projectivist explains away, say, ethical obligation or religious 
experience as being merely in us.  We are told that we have mistakenly mapped our 
phenomenology onto the world itself, and that there is no God to experience or obligations 
apart from our feelings.  Ethical realists and most theists reject this reduction.  They complain 
that, upon reflection, they are not naively projecting their feelings onto the desert landscape 
of natural events, and that projectivist accounts do not take their experiences and arguments 
seriously.   
I tend to think that Newton, Einstein, and Steven Weinberg would have much the 
same reaction to projectivist accounts of aesthetic shaping principles.  They are not imposing 
elegance and simplicity onto mathematical descriptions of the universe; they are discovering 
those properties.  Weinberg suggests that it was the beauty of general relativity that led him 
and others to embrace it before there was good evidence (Plantinga 2011, 47).  If beauty were 
merely a matter of human psychology, how could it be useful in the hard sciences?  Putting 
beauty and mathematical elegance to the side for the moment, there are plausible naturalistic 
accounts of simplicity available.  As Elliot Sober has argued, in some cases simplicity can 
understood in terms of Bayesian likelihoods (2015, chap. 2).  If e is some evidence, hs a 
simple hypothesis, and hc a more complex one, then e favors hs when the probability of e 
given hs is greater than the probability of e given hc, Pr(e| hs) > Pr(e| hc).  In order to invoke 
simplicity, says Sober, one need only argue in favor of these relative likelihoods.  In other 
cases, it can be justified purely as a matter of predictive success, the idea being that simpler 
models tend to be influenced less by noise in the data.  Without going into the details, it does 
seem to me that simplicity can largely be defended in ways amenable to naturalism.  
What about other aesthetic properties?  While elegance cannot be reduced to 
probability, one might be able to naturalize it.  This is Theo Kuipers’s approach when 
defending appeals to beauty in science (Kuipers 2002).  He allows that there is something real 
that scientists are calling ‘elegance.’  What it is, precisely, is less clear.  Consider Weinberg’s 
claim:  “Through countless false starts, we have gotten it beaten into us that nature is a certain 
way, and we have grown to look at that way that nature is as beautiful” (1992, 158).  The 
properties that Weinberg is talking about are not intrinsically beautiful, on this view, as if 
beauty were a Platonic form that might be instantiated here and there.  Aesthetic properties in 
physics are things that scientists pick up by exposure.  Physics students are given examples of 
the laws of nature and then come to see them as beautiful.  The naturalist can allow that there 
is something in the mathematics to be detected, which through experience one comes to sense 
as beauty. 
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That, it seems to me, is the most plausible approach to these questions that the 
naturalist has to offer.  What it does not explain is why there is anything out there to detect in 
the first place.  What is this property that physicists come to recognize as elegance and why 
does it exist?  That unanswered question makes many philosophers of science reluctant to 
allow aesthetic properties any place in a material world.  In fact, when Kuipers presented his 
paper titled “Beauty: A Road to Truth” several years ago at the British Society for the 
Philosophy of Science, the audience was extremely hostile.  They recognized that even a 
naturalized view of elegance did not fit well in a material world. 
This paper started with the well-established idea that science depends on 
philosophical assumptions.  That these assumptions had theistic roots, in contrast, is often 
overlooked.  Early modern scientists believed that God both ordered the cosmos in a lawlike 
way and provided humanity with the ability to discover that order.  It is no surprise, then, that 
their tacit philosophy of science most closely resembles realism.  As Plantinga and Koons 
have argued and as cognitive science now seems to suggest, naturalism lacks the resources to 
likewise provide support for realism.  A similar conclusion holds for explanatory virtues such 
as simplicity and elegance.  They are imperfect guides, no doubt, but the fact that they work 
well at all seems to require an explanation.  Once again, theism provides a rationale for their 
use while naturalism struggles to accommodate them. 
Naturalists will complain that theism is a weak explanation.  While that is debatable, 
one thing is clear:  theism made tangible contributions to the rise of modern science, which 
cannot be written-off as artifacts of a more religious age.  That should tell us something about 
the relation between science and theology, and whatever that is, it is not that the two have 
been at war for the past 400 years. 
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